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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the goal of promoting competition has been a foremost public policy
concern for decades, the means through which that goal is best achieved has continued to
remain elusive. Certainly the explicit objective of the antitrust laws is to thwart the efforts
of those who would stifle competition through actions directed at eliminating business
rivals. And though less explicit, promoting competition is also the goal of the intellectual
property laws and the purpose behind patent monopolies. Because both the antitrust and
the intellectual property laws] aim in their own ways to preserve a competitive economic
* Mr. Burling is a Senior Partner in the Boston, Massachusetts office of Hale and Dorr, L.L.P., is Chair
of Hale and Dor's Antitrust Practice Group, and is a former Chair of Hale and Don's Litigation Department. He
practices in the areas of antitrust, trade regulation, and intellectual property litigation.
** Mr. Lee is a Senior Partner in Hale and Don's Boston office and is Chair of Hale and Don's Litigation
Department. He is also a Visiting Professor from Practice at Harvard Law School. He concentrates his practice
primarily on intellectual property and commercial litigation.
*** Ms. Krug is an Attomey in the Litigation Department in Hale and Doffs Boston office.
1. Although this article refers primarily to patent rights, it generally encompasses copyright principles as
well. Unlike patent laws, "the Copyright Act [17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1332 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999)] does not
purport to limit the scope of the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)]." Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, whereas the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994 &
Supp. i 1996), expressly permits a patent holder to refuse to license its patent, the Copyright Act provides
"only an exclusive right to distribute the copyrighted work," 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 71 lb, at 202 (1996); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Nonetheless, courts have generally held that
copyright holders, like patentees, are not obligated to license copyrighted works. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
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environment, the course to steer when the two doctrines come into conflict logically
presents a challenge for the courts. Notably, patent law has lost out in several recent
cases, perhaps because the pro-competitive effect of patent laws is less direct and thus
easily overshadowed by the immediate mission of the antitrust laws to foster competition.
This Article discusses how courts have addressed so-called "duty-to-deal" antitrust claims
involving intellectual property, and what they should do in those circumstances to ensure
appropriate deference to the competition goals of intellectual property doctrine.
Part II discusses duty-to-deal principles in the general case, where intellectual
property rights are not at issue, noting that hard and fast rules have yet to emerge.
2 Part
III discusses the approaches courts have taken in the intellectual property context and
contends that, although many courts have conducted their analyses with a view to the
objectives of patent law, at least two have not, with potentially detrimental consequences
for the preservation of patent rights. 3 Part IV discusses two recent cases involving
significant antitrust and intellectual property issues-In re Intel Corp.4 and United States
v. Microsoft.5 Each of the cases highlights a different facet that courts must consider as
they confront an increasing number of cases with intellectual property and antitrust
implications. The Article concludes by suggesting that any doctrine endeavoring to
navigate the waters of intellectual property/antitrust cases must devote considerable
attention to patent law and its objectives. 6 When that attention is given, there are only a
few circumstances (involving intellectual property rights) in which a duty to deal should
be imposed.
II. REFUSALS TO DEAL
When determining how to treat unilateral refusals to deal in licensing intellectual
property, a central issue is whether "a unilateral refusal to license a patent should be
treated like any other refusal to deal by a monopolist, where the patent has afforded its
holder monopoly power over an economic market."7 This query rests on the
presupposition that there are some clear principles guiding courts as they analyze "any
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Service
& Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686 (4th Cir. 1992).
The discussion, however, does not encompass trade secret rights because "there is presumptively less
accommodation of federal antitrust to state trade secret law, as compared with patent and copyright law." 3
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra, 1 71 Ic, at 203. Whereas trade secrets are protected under state law, and that
protection is sometimes "excessive and anticompetitive," patent protection is provided by .federal law and is on
an "equal footing with the antitrust laws." Id. Both are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, "which have
accommodated each to the other." Id. Trade secret protection under state law does not accord a trade secret
holder the level of protection accorded patent and copyright holders under the laws governing those types of
intellectual property. See id. But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.1 (1995) [hereinafter IP Guidelines] ("The
Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving any other form of tangible or
intangible property.").
2. See infra Part 1I.
3. See infra Part Ill.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See id.
6. See infra Part V.
7. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted).
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other refusal to deal." As the following discussion demonstrates, that presupposition is
dubious.
As a general proposition, Section 2 of the Sherman Act permits one firm unilaterally
to refuse to conduct business with another firm, even if such a refusal perpetuates
monopoly power for the refusing firm. 8 In United States v. Colgate,9 the Supreme Court
declined to endorse the creation of a duty to deal merely to thwart possession of
monopoly power, reasoning that the Act did not modify the firm's right "freely to exercise
[its] own independent discretion as to parties with whom [it] will deal." 10 The Court also
observed, however, that a refusal to deal would run afoul of Section 2 when a monopolist
had exhibited an intent to establish or to maintain a monopoly.' I
The Supreme Court's post-Colgate decisions applying refusal-to-deal analysis
provide the point of departure for the development of modem duty-to-deal exceptions.
12
Seventy-two years ago, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,13 the
Court affirmed the jury's verdict of monopolization in a case in which Kodak refused to
sell wholesale products to a retailer, whose business Kodak had unsuccessfully sought to
acquire. 14 Focusing on Kodak's motivation, the Court determined that Kodak's refusal to
sell wholesale products to a competing retailer at the usual dealer discount could not be
attributable to any motive other than the intent to create a monopoly.
15
In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,16 the Court affirmed a verdict finding a
Section 2 violation in a newspaper's refusal to sell advertising space to customers that had
also bought advertising from a newly-established radio station that had become the
paper's main competitor. 17 The Court determined that even though the newspaper had a
right freely to choose the competitors and customers with which it would deal, that right,
8. Section 2 of the Sherman Act interdicts efforts to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several states." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
In general, the antitrust laws are violated if a refusal to deal "unnecessarily" excludes competitors, that
is, if the conduct "does not benefit consumers by making a better product or service available.., and instead
has the effect of impairing competition." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597
(1985) (observing that the relevant question is whether a defendant has acquired, maintained, or employed
monopoly power in a relevant market "by arrangements and policies which rather than being a consequence of a
superior product, superior business sense, or historic element, were designed primarily to further any
domination of the relevant market or sub-market").
9. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
10. Id. at 307; see also Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 1991)
("Generally, a business has the right to deal or not deal with whomever it likes, as long as it does so
independently.").
11. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
12. See Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 750-62 (1995).
13. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
14. See id. at 368-69.
15. Seeid. at 375.
16. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
17. See id. at 148.
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like all rights, was not unqualified. 18 In particular, the newspaper's exercise of that right
"as a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce" was impermissible under
the Sherman Act. 19 Citing Colgate, the Court concluded that the newspaper's conduct
"amounted to an attempt by the publisher to destroy [the radio station] and, at the same
time, to regain the publisher's pre-1948 substantial monopoly over the mass
dissemination of all news and advertising. "
20
The Court's next refusal-to-deal case, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
2 1
involved a situation in which the defendant electric utility company, which held a
regulated monopoly for electric power distribution in a multi-state area and also sold
power at the retail level, refused to sell wholesale power to competing municipal power
companies.22 In addition, Otter Tail refused to "wheel" power to municipal systems, and
it sought to prevent them from gaining access to alternative power suppliers.23 The result
was the elimination of competition in retail electric power.24 Citing Lorain Journal and
Southern Photo, the Court affirmed the lower court's determination that Otter Tail had
violated Section 2 by "attempt[ing] to prevent communities in which its retail distribution
franchise had expired from replacing it with a municipal distribution system."25 The
Court also affirmed the lower court's decree requiring Otter Tail to sell and to wheel
wholesale power to municipal systems. 2
6
On the basis of the Supreme Court's refusal-to-deal cases, lower courts proceeded to
carve out exceptions to the general no-duty-to-deal premise, applying two separate modes
of analysis: intent and essential facility. 27 The basic thrust of the intent test derives
directly from Colgate and Southern Photo: a firm may be in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act if its purpose in refusing to deal is "to create or maintain a monopoly."
28
But the test has not remained so simple. In more recent decisions, courts have come to
evaluate not only subjective intent, but also the business justification for and the
competitive effect of a monopolist's refusal to deal.29 The essential facility approach, as
18. See id. at 155.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 153.
21. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
22. See id. at 368.
23. See id. As the Court explained, the practice of "wheeling" was "to transfer by direct transmission or
displacement electric power from one utility to another over the facilities of an intermediate utility." Id.
24. See id.
25. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368.
26. See id.
27. See Glazer & Lipsky, supra note 12, at 753-54; Soap Opera Now, Inc. v. Network Publ'g Corp., 737 F.
Supp. 1338, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("As this 'common law' of monopolization has evolved, the situations in
which refusal to deal by a monopolist may violate Section 2 have grouped themselves around several
formulae.") (discussing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1979)).
28. Soap Opera Now, 737 F. Supp. at 1342-43.
29. See, e.g., Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 957 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir. 1992) ("In
determining whether a monopolist which has refused to deal with a competitor has acted lawfully or in violation
of Section 2, we apply a two-part test. First, we look at the effects of the monopolist's conduct. Second, we look
at its motivation."); MCI Communications v. AT&T Corp., 708 F.2d 1081, 1148 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that the
intent test requires courts to "focus on the intent and competitive effect of the refusal to deal"). Some courts
have found intent immaterial when the refusal to deal can be justified economically. See, e.g., Ocean State
Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989) ("As long
as Blue Cross's course of conduct was itself legitimate, the fact that some of its executives hoped to see Ocean
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applicable to unilateral conduct under Section 2,30 has its origins in Otter Tail.3 1 Under
this approach, a firm is obliged to permit competitors to use the facility on non-
discriminatory terms if it controls a facility that is essential to the livelihood of its
competitors.3 2 The Seventh Circuit has created a widely-accepted test for determining the
applicability of the doctrine: (1) a monopolist controls an essential facility; (2)
competitors are practicably unable to duplicate the facility; (3) the monopolist denies the
facility to its competitors; and (4) shared use of the facility is feasible.
33
There seems to be no articulable demarcation between cases in which courts have
applied the intent test and cases in which they have instead employed essential facility
analysis. 34 Although the essential facility test has been applied predominantly to cases in
which a monopolist controls a facility deemed essential to a competitor in a vertically-
related market, at least one court has applied it in a case, involving only a single market,
in which a monopolist refused to pursue a joint-venture relationship with a competitor.
35
For its part, the intent test has been applied to "every kind of refusal to deal. ' 36 In short,
"There is a significant amount of overlap" between the two doctrines with respect to the
facts to which each has been applied,37 and as of yet, no court has coherently formulated
the scenarios appropriate to each test. Indeed, as discussed below, the Tenth Circuit has
State disappear is irrelevant."); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 370 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that evidence of a legitimate business justification will protect a monopolist from Section 2
liability, even in light of a finding of anticompetitive intent). The fact that courts evaluate objective rationales
for monopolists' refusals to deal rather than mere subjective intent means that the label "intent test" is somewhat
inapt. See Glazer & Lipsky, supra note 12, at 755.
30. The essential facility doctrine originated in Sherman Act Section 1 cases. See, e.g., Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Gamco, Inc. v.
Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952).
31. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
32. The scope of the essential facility doctrine is narrow. First, as Professor Areeda points out, because
"there was already in place a regulatory agency that supervised prices and terms of dealings with local
distributors," the Otter Tail Court was uniquely able to "require Otter Tail to deal but never burden itself with
the administrative details." Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 848 (1990). Second, because the purpose of the doctrine is to "prevent a firm with
monopoly power from extending that power 'from one stage of production into another, and from one market
into another,"' Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting MCI,
708 F.2d at 1132), a monopolist's conduct is exclusionary and thus unlawful when it "denies a competitor access
to a facility [the competitor] needs to compete," Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 12. However, because a
monopolist's denial of a facility "to one who ... is not an actual or potential competitor" does not enhance its
market power, such conduct does not implicate Section 2. Id. (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1 736.2d, 736.2e (Supp. 1986)).
In addition to requiring that the facility be absolutely essential, the doctrine applies only where
absence of the facility will virtually eliminate competition. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,
948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991). If both requirements are met, an antitrust violation will be presumed, unless
the monopolist has a legitimate business justification for its conduct. See City of Anaheim v. Southern
California Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992).
33. SeeMCI,708F.2dat 1133.
34. See Glazer & Lipsky, supra note 12, at 759.
35. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1518 (10th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 472
U.S. 585 (1985). The court noted it was "not convinced that the essential touchstone of bottleneck cases is
vertical integration." Aspen Highlands Skiing, 738 F.2d at 1518 n. 11.
36. Glazer & Lipsky, supra note 12, at 765.
37. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 738 F.2d at 1519-20.
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applied both tests in the same case,38 and to add farther confusion, the Supreme Court
has neither rejected nor embraced either test.39
The Court's primary doctrinal pronouncement for modem refusal-to-deal cases is
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co.,4 0 in which Aspen Skiing Co., the
owner of three of four ski areas in Aspen, Colorado, discontinued its participation in an
interchangeable, six-day, all-Aspen lift ticket. Aspen Skiing Co. ("Skiing Co.") offered
the ticket jointly with Aspen Highlands, and it became very popular among visitors to the
resort because of the variety it facilitated.4 1 In addition, when Highlands sought
independently to market an all-area ticket, Skiing Co. refused "to sell Highlands any lift
tickets, either at the tour operator's discount or at retail." 42 Skiing Co. also refused to
accept an all-area pass marketed by Highlands that contained vouchers, guaranteed by a
local bank, that were exchangeable for Skiing Co.'s day passes. 43 The result was that
Highlands lost a significant portion of its previous share of the Aspen skiing market.44
Employing both the intent test and the essential facility test, the court of appeals
held that the multi-day, multi-area ticket could be deemed an "essential facility" that
Skiing Co. was obliged to market with Highlands. 45 The court also determined that the
record contained sufficient evidence to support a finding that, in refusing to market the
all-area ticket, Skiing Co. intended to create or to maintain a monopoly. 46 The Supreme
Court took neither tack. It acknowledged at the outset that "even a firm with monopoly
power has no general duty to engage in a joint marketing program with a competitor," but
observed that the case did not rest "on any such proposition of law."47 Relying on Lorain
Journal, the Court emphasized that Skiing Co. "elected to make an important change in a
pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted for
several years,"48 but was unable to provide any legitimate business purpose for that
change.4 9 Based on the facts that Skiing Co. gained no short-term benefits by refusing to
continue with the joint ticket arrangement and that consumers were harmed by that
decision, the Court determined that "the monopolist made a deliberate effort to
discourage its customers from doing business with its small rival." 50 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court expressly declined to "consider the possible relevance of the
38. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 47-59.
40. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
41. See id. at 589-95.
42. Id. at 593.
43. See id. at 593-94.
44. See id. at 594.
45. See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1984).
46. See id. at 1521-22.
47. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985).
48. Id. at 603.
49. The Court thus seemed to eschew reliance on evidence of subjective intent and instead focused on
"objective actions and the justifications for them." Patrick J. Ahern, Refusals to Deal After Aspen, 63
ANTITRUST 153, 165 (1994). In this case, Skiing Co.'s justifications for its actions were that Highlands was an
inferior skiing facility, that the method that companies had used to calculate revenue shares was unreliable, and
that accepting the vouchers included in Highland's all-area tickets was administratively burdensome. See Aspen
Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608-10. Skiing Co. provided no credible evidence for these justifications, however. See id.
50. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610.
[Spring
The Antitrust Duty to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights
'essential facility' doctrine," 5 1 as well as the question whether conduct motivated by
anticompetitive intent could constitute an antitrust violation, regardless of the nature of
that conduct.
52
In its most recent opportunity to clarify these issues, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,53 the Court provided little additional guidance. The plaintiff's
claim that Kodak unlawfully refused to deal under Section 2 was based on the assertion
by various independent service organizations (ISOs) that Kodak refused to sell parts to
any owner of Kodak photocopying and micrographics equipment, unless the owner also
purchased equipment servicing from Kodak. 54 In addition, Kodak allegedly refused to
purchase replacement parts from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who also
sold the parts to ISOs.5 5 Lastly, Kodak allegedly "pressured Kodak equipment owners
and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISOs."56 Affirming the Ninth
Circuit's denial of summary judgment, the Court observed that, "If Kodak adopted its
parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power, it will have violated § 2.",57 In addition, the Court found that
"respondents ha[d] presented evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain
its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the
Kodak service market;" 58 thus, only legitimate business justifications could save Kodak
from Section 2 liability. Without setting forth any particular formula for its decision or
commenting on any "categories" of refusal-to-deal analysis, the Court determined there
were issues of material fact as to whether Kodak's proffered justifications were valid.5 9
The Supreme Court has thus provided no firm guiding principles for courts to
employ in determining when a monopolist must deal with its competitors. The case law
demonstrates that the orderliness of any doctrinal categories is illusory, and that duty-to-
deal "principles" rest on unpredictable and even eclectic combinations of "intent" and
"essential facility" notions, heavily entwined with the facts of each particular case.
Further, courts have been less than rigorous in identifying salient facts of the cases before
them. As Glazer and Lipsky point out, "the basic shortcoming of the refusal-to-deal cases
is their failure to identify and to analyze the antitrust significance of key distinctions
among the enormous variety of factual patterns that have been encountered in Section 2
litigation involving refusals to deal." 60 The most that the cases indicate is that, in general,
51. Id. at 611 n.44. Arguably, the Aspen Skiing approach may be more flexible than the essential facility
doctrine because the latter doctrine requires that the monopolist's competitors be completely unable to compete
without access to the essential facility. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536,
544 (9th Cir. 1991) ("A facility that is controlled by a single firm will be considered 'essential' only if control of
the facility carries with it the power to eliminate competition in the downstream market.").
52. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
53. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
54. See id. at 458.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 483.
58. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483.
59. See id. at 483-87.
60. Glazer & Lipsky, supra note 12, at 751 (1995) (arguing that "key differences in the specific facts and
circumstances of refusal-to-deal cases should be consciously identified and their antitrust significance
recognized in order to simplify and rationalize analysis of single-firm conduct under Section 2").
1999]
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there is a duty to deal "when the monopolist's refusal to deal results in an important
change in a competitive market that negatively affects consumers."
6 1
That the general duty-to-deal case law evinces such diverse analyses and results
means that it gives depressingly little guidance in considering when a duty to deal may be
judicially imposed on a patent or copyright holder. Moreover, as Areeda and Hovenkamp
point out, duty-to-deal analysis is fraught with problems. First, imposing such a duty to
deal is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law because it makes consumers no better
off, and "the right to share a monopoly discourages firms from developing their own
alternative inputs."62 Second, forcing a dominant firm to deal under Section 2 creates a
risk of collusion subject to Section 1 liability, forcing the firm "to thread a very small
needle in an area where antitrust is plagued with ambiguity. ' 63 Third, it is illogical to
regard a monopolist's refusal to deal as an antitrust injury because "antitrust is not
concerned with preserving monopoly by requiring firms to divide the proceeds."
64
Fourth, even in those situations in which a refusal to deal "seems anticompetitive because
there is little hope of competitive alternatives to the claimed facility," requiring the
defendant to deal has no effect on price or market output.65 And fifth, the doctrine raises
complex questions concerning "which services or commodities are sufficiently important
to warrant compulsory dealing" and what should be the terms of the mandated
agreement.66
Thus, as discussed in the next part of this Article, any general refusal-to-deal
principles that may be discerned-whether based on intent or essential facility analysis,
or a combination thereof-seem manifestly inappropriate for export to the intellectual
property context. It is thus of great importance that courts not thoughtlessly extend
already-suspect "principles" into the intellectual property realm.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL
With the exception of the second Kodak case,67 none of the Supreme Court's duty-
to-deal precedents involved intellectual property. And in Kodak, intellectual property
rights played no meaningful role in the Court's analysis. Thus, the intersection of duty-to-
deal antitrust analysis and intellectual property law remains virtually.uncharted territory.
Although the lack of clarity and coherence in general duty-to-deal law seems reason
enough not to extend its reach to monopolists who achieved or maintained their power by
obtaining intellectual property rights, the Constitution and Congress provide the strongest
rationale for refraining from such an extension. As discussed below, provisions in both
the Constitution and federal statutes recognize that patent rights are pro-competitive and
therefore not inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law.68 To the extent that the patent
laws and the antitrust laws must be balanced against each other in application to
61. Ahem, supra note 49, at 159.
62. 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 771b, at 174 (1996).
63. Id. 772c4, at 195.
64. Id. 774b, at 220.
65. Id.
66. Id. 770e, at 171.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
68. See infra Part III.A.
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paticular practices, Congress has largely completed that task and, accordingly, courts
should not create exceptions to this balance without clear reason. Likewise, as courts
have recognized, copyrights similarly serve pro-competitive functions. The only
exceptions to the principle that patent and copyright holders have no duty to deal should
remain those that already exist under intellectual property law as part of that
congressional judgment and balance-enforced dealing to remedy patent and copyright
misuse.
A. Case Law and Congressional Policy
The patent laws were enacted pursuant to Congress's authority to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. "69 The classic
definition of the rights of a patent owner is the right to exclude. 70 Thus, the patent laws
create a monopoly in the "discovery" for the inventor who spent the time and resources
necessary to create the invention. The monopoly owner is thereby insulated from "the
competitive exploitation of his patented art. ' 7 1 The policy judgment is clear: the prospect
of rewards spurs innovation in the first place, which, in turn, generates competition, the
same goal as that of the antitrust laws.72
Notwithstanding the legal quagmire that has developed regarding unilateral refusals
to deal generally, courts have been largely consistent in their determinations that, because
of the nature of intellectual property, patent owners are not obligated to license to their
competitors. 73 Of course, a patent monopoly does raise antitrust concerns if the patented
product dominates its market. In such a situation, patent and antitrust laws are brought
into apparent conflict. As the Second Circuit explained in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. :74
When the patented product, as is often the case, represents merely one of many
products that effectively compete in a given product market, few antitrust
69. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
70. See, e.g., 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 704a, at 151.
71. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. See id. at 1203. As the court explained:
The patent laws reward the inventor with the power to exclude others from exploiting his
invention for a period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). In return, the public benefits
from the disclosure of inventions, the entrance into the market of valuable products whose
invention might have been delayed but for the incentives provided by the patent laws, and the
increased competition the patented product creates in the marketplace. The antitrust laws, on the
other hand, were enacted to protect competition in the market. The antitrust laws are based upon
the fundamental premise that the public benefits most from a competitive marketplace.
Id.
73. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 704.1, at 150 (Supp. 1998)
(listing cases).
Until recently, courts have uniformly held that the owner of valid patents who has not engaged in
any form of misuse such as the tying of unpatented articles or the bringing of unjustified
infringement claims has not violated the antitrust laws, and thus cannot be compelled by § 2 of
the Sherman Act to license these patents to competitors.
Id.
74. 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
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problems arise. When however, the patented product is so successful that it
evolves into its own economic market... or succeeds in engulfing a large
section of a preexisting product market, the patent and antitrust laws
necessarily clash. In such cases the primary purpose of the antitrust laws to
preserve competition can be frustrated, albeit temporarily, by a holder's
exercise of the patent's inherent exclusionary power during its term.
75
But usually a patent holder has no duty to deal.76 In SCM, the plaintiff claimed that
Xerox's acquisition of various patents and its subsequent refusal to license those patents
"excluded SCM from competing effectively in a relevant product market and submarket
dominated by Xerox products that embraced that patented art.' 7 7 The Second Circuit held
that, as long as the patent was lawfully acquired, "subsequent conduct permissible under
the patent laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws." 78 The court
explicitly addressed whether "the exclusionary power ordinarily inherent in a patent"
should extend to situations in which the patent monopoly has evolved into an economic
monopoly.79 But the result was the same:
Where a patent in the first instance has been lawfully acquired, a patent holder
ordinarily should be allowed to exercise his patent's exclusionary power even
after achieving commercial success; to allow the imposition of treble damages
based on what a reviewing court might later consider, with the benefit of
hindsight, to be too much success would seriously threaten the integrity of the
patent system. 8
0
Because a patent holder definitionally is free to exercise his power to exclude,
neither the intent of the patent holder in refusing to license nor the business rationale for
the refusal are relevant considerations. After all, intent analysis is primarily utilized to
determine whether a monopolist's conduct is "fairly characterized as 'exclusionary,"'
8 1
and business justifications, for their part, are "case-specific factors" that courts employ in
75. Id. In addition, patents that have been acquired, rather than internally developed, may under some
circumstances warrant less protection from antitrust laws, as may patents that remain unused. In particular,
reduced protection may be warranted where a firm that dominates a market seeks to acquire exclusive patent
rights in order to exclude potential market competitors, regardless whether the firm actually plans to use the
patents. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, 1 704.1, at 154. Areeda and Hovenkamp note, however,
that even in the case of acquired and unused patents, "a much more appropriate remedy would be to condemn
the patent acquisitions themselves or insist that the licenses be nonexclusive." Id. 704. 1, at 154 n. 17.
Id.
76. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70,1 704.1, at 150.
77. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 1206.
79. Id. at 1204.
80. Id. at 1206. Most courts that have considered the intersection between patent and antitrust law have
reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609
(6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); Boston
Scientific Corp. v. Schneider (Europe) A.G., 983 F. Supp. 245, 269 (D. Mass. 1997); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (D. Kan. 1997); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., 870 F.
Supp. 1042, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags, A.B., 701 F. Supp. 1157,
1162 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
81. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
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deciding whether particular refusals to deal may be deemed exclusionary.8 2 But in the
intellectual property context, statutory protections mean that, absent patent misuse, fraud
in the acquisition of the patent, or some other qualification of intellectual property rights,
a monopolist is under all circumstances justified in asserting its intellectual property
rights to their fullest extent. Put another way, "Absent claims of invalidity or misuse,
there is nothing case-specific to consider. And it makes no sense to consider whether the
assertion of the right is 'fairly characterized as "exclusionary' because exclusion is the
essence... [of] every assertion of an intellectual property right."8 3
Congressional policy fully coincides with the courts' recognition of "an implied and
limited 'patent' exception to the antitrust laws." 84 In particular, codifying the case law, 85
Congress in 1988 amended the patent laws to provide that "No patent owner otherwise
entitled to relief for [patent] infringement ... shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of... refus[ing] to license or use
any rights to the patent .. ,"86 Thus, Section 271 "clearly prevents an infringer from
using a patent misuse defense when the patent owner has unilaterally refused a license. "87
The statute also prohibits antitrust claims based on a refusal to license a patent.88
Although Congress has enacted no equivalent of Section 271 in the Copyright Act, case
law has drawn from patent law doctrine to determine that copyright holders have the right
both to license the copyright to whomever they choose, and to refuse to license the
copyright to anyone. 89
82. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Image Technical Servs. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-15293, 96-15296) (discussing Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602).
83. Id. (citations omitted). In one court's words, "We cannot require antitrust defendants to prove and
reprove the merits of this legislative assumption in every case." Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994). Buttressing the case law and Congressional intent are the "Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property," promulgated by the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, which explicitly state that there is no duty to deal in the intellectual property
context. See IP Guidelines, supra note 1, § 2.2 (noting that market power conferred by intellectual property
does not "impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that property to others").
The Guidelines also state, however, that the special characteristics of intellectual property "can be taken into
account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require the application of fundamentally different
principles." Id. § 2.1.
84. Boston Scientific, 983 F. Supp. at 269 (citing Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1186).
85. See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 197 (1988-89)
(noting that "Because little controversy exists over the right of a patent owner to refuse to use a patent or to
license [to] others, the codification adds little to existing law").
86. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1994).
87. Data Gen., 36 F.3d at 1187.
88. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D. Kan. 1997) (determining that
any interpretation that section 271(d) does not bar antitrust claims, predicated on a patentee's unilateral refusal
to license, "is contrary to the statutory language and legislative history of the amendment"); see also Data Gen.,
36 F.3d at 1187 (observing that section 271 "may even herald the prohibition of all antitrust claims and
counterclaims premised on a refusal to license a patent").
89. See Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Laurel Sand
& Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 1991) for the proposition that "Generally, a
business has the right to deal or not deal with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently," as well as
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)); see also supra note I (discussing the overlap of
patent and copyright principles).
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B. The Exceptions
As the language of Section 271 indicates, antitrust liability may be imposed in
situations in which acquisition or usage of a patent was itself unlawful, rendering the
patent unenforceable or invalid--that is, in cases of patent misuse. This is the flip side of
the principle that patent holders may do as they please with their intellectual property,
irrespective of whether they have manifested any intent to monopolize. Patent misuse is
typically employed as a defense to a patent infringement claim and, in certain contexts,
may rise to the level of an antitrust violation.
90
One variety of patent misuse is based on a patentee's literal "misuse" of its patent-
misuse that renders the patent unenforceable for the duration of the misuse. In this
context, a patent is misused if used "to foster price-fixing arrangements or extend the
patent monopoly to other products through tying arrangements. "9 1 It is also misuse if the
patentee requires a patent licensee not to deal in goods that compete with the patented
product, 92 conditions the license of one patent on the license of others, 93 or requires that
the licensee pay royalties on unpatented items.94 An antitrust violation should be found
where such conduct is accompanied by market power and anticompetitive effect.95 Thus,
the pertinent inquiry is whether the patent holder has "impermissibly broadened the
'physical or temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect."96
A second type of patent misuse occurs when a patentee relies upon a patent that is
invalid; the patentee in such situations holds no legitimate patent monopoly. In this
context, the misuse exception assumes two primary forms. The first category of cases
follows the decision in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,97 and holds that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent
90. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[2], at 19-298 (1998) ("Use of a patent to
violate the antitrust laws will constitute misuse. However, conduct which in some respect falls short of an
antitrust violation may still constitute misuse.").
91. Boston Scientific Corp. v. Schneider (Europe) A.G., 983 F. Supp. 245, 269 (D. Mass. 1997). The FTC
recently alleged this type of patent misuse against two companies, Summit Technology, Inc. and VISX, Inc.,
contending that the companies pooled patents into a new partnership in order to "Raise, fix, stabilize and
maintain" license fees. Complaint 8, 25, In re Summit Tech., Inc. (F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1998) (No. 9286). The
companies and the FTC subsequently entered into a settlement agreement, which, among other things, provided
for the dissolution of the pooling arrangement. FTC Decisions and Orders (visited Apr. 3, 1999) <http://www.
ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09286summitd&o.htm>, <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09286visxd&o.htm>.
92. See National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1943) ("A
patentee's right does not extend to the use of the patent to purge the market of competing non-patented goods
except, of course, through the process of fair competition.").
93. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25, 33-34 (7th Cir. 1967) (affirming a
district court finding that Zenith misused its patents by attempting to force a licensee to accept a package of
licenses).
94. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
95. Courts are divided as to whether, in the absence of market power and anticompetitive effect, a
patentee's conduct may ever constitute misuse. Compare, e.g., Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
487 F. Supp. 885, 892-93 (D. Mass. 1980), affld, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[P]atent misuse may be seen as
having... a lesser burden of proof than an antitrust claim."), with USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., 694 F.2d 505, 573
(7th Cir. 1982) (determining that without market power or anticompetitive effect, there can be no patent
misuse).
96. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed Cir. 1997) (quoting Windsurfing Int'l,
Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
97. 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
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Office may violate Section 2, provided that all other required elements of a Section 2
claim are demonstrated. 98 The second category of cases is based on the Ninth Circuit's
Handgards decisions, 99 in which the court determined that antitrust liability may be
imposed against a patent holder who pursues a patent infringement claim in bad
faith-that is, with knowledge that the patents, though lawfully obtained, are otherwise
invalid. Here, too, the infringement defendant must prove the other elements of a Section
2 claim.100
C. Judicial Missteps
Courts in at least two recent cases have disregarded the narrowness of the categories
of exceptions and instead applied traditional duty-to-deal analysis in the intellectual
property context. One case proceeded from the premise that the legality of a patent
holder's refusal to deal depends on the defendant's mental state; 10 1 the other applied both
intent and essential facility analysis, without giving appropriate weight to intellectual
property considerations. 102 These cases demonstrate the difficulties manifest in extending
general duty-to-deal principles to intellectual property cases.
First, in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 103 the Ninth Circuit
on remand held that valid intellectual property rights create only a presumption of
legitimate business justification for anticompetitive conduct. As noted by a Kansas
district court analyzing the case, the Ninth Circuit apparently assumed at the outset that
any single patent can create an "inherent" monopoly in no more than one market. 10 4
However, the court seemed to arrive at this conclusion only by extrapolating from a
footnote in the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Kodak, which stated with regard to
Section 1 of the Sherman Act that a "power gained through some natural and legal
advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a
seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next."'
10 5
98. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
99. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1294 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that immunity from
antitrust liability recognized in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine "does not extend to 'sham proceedings,"' and that
bad faith litigation is the equivalent of sham proceedings); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 202
(9th Cir. 1979) (determining that, in an antitrust suit based on a bad faith claim of patent infringement, "the jury
should be instructed that a patentee's infringement suit is presumptively in good faith and that this presumption
can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence").
Even in the sham litigationIHandgards context, where there is a strong temptation to evaluate the
subjective intent of the patentee, the Court has emphasized utilization of an objective test. See Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 64 (1993) (holding that a copyright
holder's motivation in bringing an infringement action is irrelevant and that an effort to litigate can be
considered a "sham" only if not objectively reasonable).
100. See Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, 421 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
101. See Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
102. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
103. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
104. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D. Kan. 1997).
105. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (quoting Times-
Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)).
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Acknowledging that "the right of exclusive dealing is reserved from antitrust
liability," and that there was apparently "no reported case in which a court has imposed
antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or copyright, 10 6 the
court nonetheless determined that the jury must merely "account for" the statutory rights
contained within the intellectual property laws.10 7 "To ensure such consideration," the
panel adopted "a modified version of' Data General's presumption that intellectual
property rights are a valid business justification for a refusal to deal. 108 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that such a presumption "should act to focus the factfinder on the primary
interest of both intellectual property and antitrust laws: public interest." 109
Finding that the district court's failure to "give any weight to Kodak's intellectual
property rights" in its jury instructions to be an abuse of discretion, the court nonetheless
concluded that the error was harmless because the presumption could be-and was-
rebutted by evidence that Kodak's refusal to license was not based on its desire to protect
its patent rights. 10 In particular, the court found it significant that Kodak's parts manager
had testified that he had not considered the patents at the time Kodak implemented its
parts policy. I 1 In addition, Kodak, in its conduct, had not distinguished among patented
and nonpatented parts. 112 The court thus abrogated the doctrine that a lawfully-acquired
patent immunizes from antitrust liability subsequent conduct permissible under the patent
or copyright laws. 113
As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the relationship between a
patent and the markets it affects is unrealistic: leveraging does not exist "when a patent
holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the patent grant." 114 Prior to Kodak,
although courts had imposed constraints on the conduct of patent holders, "none of those
instances involved overriding an express patent law grant." 115 The Supreme Court's
statement that the extension of monopoly power from one market into another may give
rise to antitrust liability is inapposite where a patentee exercises his statutory right not to
license the patented product, and thereby acquires a monopoly in what are two separate
relevant markets for antitrust purposes.1 16 As one court has stated in response to Kodak,
"patents only claim inventions. Because each use of that invention may be prevented by
106. Image Technical., 125 F.3d at 1216.
107. Id. at 1218.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
110. Id. at 1219 ("Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct."). Notably, the
Kodak court's determination that evidence of pretext could rebut the presumption made no reference to Data
General, which noted that the presumption may be defeated only in the event of "rare cases in which imposing
antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act," but did not suggest what those
"rare cases" might be. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 n.64 (1st Cir.
1994).
I11. See Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1219.
112. See id.
113. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, 704.1, at 152 (Supp. 1998).
114. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D. Kan. 1997).
115. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 708d, at 190.
116. See ISO Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. at 1135.
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the patent holder, the patent may have some anticompetitive effect in each market in
which it is used or not used." 117
An equally fundamental misstep in the Ninth Circuit's analysis was its conclusion
that a patent holder's intent in refusing to license its patents is relevant in the
determination of antitrust liability. Although intent to monopolize is a cornerstone of a
Section 2 claim, "proof of intent to monopolize cannot transform a patent holder's
unilateral refusal to deal into unlawful exclusionary conduct." 118 The Kodak panel's
assertion to the contrary conflicts with the Supreme Court's determination in Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,119 that one's intent in
pursuing an infringement claim is irrelevant as long as the claim is objectively
reasonable. 120 It also runs afoul of both Section 271(d) 12 1 and the Court's repeated
holdings that a patentee is under no obligation, regardless of the circumstances, to license
a lawfully-acquired patent. 122 There is no apparent justification for the result:
The standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Kodak makes it very difficult
for a jury, a judge, or even the patent holder, to distinguish between a
permissible refusal to deal (based on a desire to profit from and protect patent
rights) and an impermissible refusal to deal (apparently based on a desire to
obtain a competitive advantage by excluding competitors). A patent holder
does not refuse to share its invention because the property is patented, rather,
the refusal is based on a desire to obtain a competitive advantage. To classify
the desire to obtain a competitive advantage over competitors as pretext is to
read the right to exclude out of the patent statute. 123
Kodak's confused analysis may, at base, be attributable to the fact that Kodak made
no real effort to distinguish between patented and unpatented parts. Nor did it make any
effort to assess whether that distinction itself somehow moved Kodak's conduct beyond
any legitimate monopoly flowing from its lawful patent rights. Thus, although the court's
intellectual property analysis was grossly misguided, it seems that its ultimate conclusion
117. Id. at 1136; see also Triad Sys. Corp v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995);
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
118. ISO Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. at 1140; see also Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that so long as a defendant's course
of conduct is objectively legitimate, the fact that it hoped to harm its competition "is no more guilty of an
antitrust violation than a boxer who delivers a perfectly legal punch-hoping that it will kill his opponent-is
guilty of attempted murder").
119. 508 U.S. 49,64(1993).
120. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 64 (1993).
121. Although the Kodak court concluded that § 271(d) permits antitrust claims based on a refusal to
license patented work, see Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1997), that conclusion was misguided, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945) (noting that a patent holder
"is not a trustee for the public" and "has no obligation either to use [the invention] or to grant its use to others");
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 426-30 (1908) (observing that "exclusion
may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any
owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive").
123. ISO Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. at 1141 (D. Kans. 1997) (citing 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note !, 705b at 156).
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might rest less on the evidence that Kodak's business justification was pretextual, than on
the realization its business justification was legally insufficient to begin with.
Regardless, at least one other court has in part followed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
regarding intent, and additionally incorporated essential facility reasoning 124 into its
analysis. In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,125 a district court in Alabama held that a
monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a lawfully-acquired patent or copyright may
constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct in violation of Section 2. Intergraph, itself an
Intel customer, had claimed in a lawsuit against third parties that their Intel-based
technology infringed certain Intergraph patents. 126 The third parties in turn sought
indemnification from Intel. 127 Intergraph contended that its lawsuit prompted Intel to
increase pressure on Intergraph to accept a provision in Intergraph's license from Intel
requiring Intergraph to license all of its patented technology to Intel at no cost.
12 8 When
Intergraph refused, Intel withdrew proposed agreements for the provision of new
microprocessor samples and information.129 Seeking preliminary injunctive relief,
Intergraph claimed that Intel had violated the antitrust laws by withdrawing these
agreements and leaving Intergraph without access to a key component for development of
future computer products. 1
30
Addressing Intel's unilateral refusal to deal with Intergraph, the court noted that
"Reasonable and timely access to critical business information that is necessary to
compete is an essential facility," and that a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license the
information violates Section 2, even when the information is not "indispensable."
13 1
Rather, the refusal must merely handicap competitors severely and unreasonably.
132
Observing that Intergraph was locked-in to Intel's technology, the court concluded that
Intel's refusal to supply advanced products and technical information to Intergraph "likely
violate[d] § 2" because the products and information "cannot be feasibly duplicated, and
because competitors cannot effectively compete in the relevant markets without access to
them." 133 The court also determined both that Intel had no legitimate business
justification for its refusal to continue to license its technical information to Intergraph
because Intergraph had been a "loyal and beneficial customer of Intel," and that the two
companies could have resolved Intergraph's patent claims without Intel denying
Intergraph the requisite information. 134 Relying on the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision,
124. See supra note 32.
125. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
126. See id. at 1266.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1267.
129. See id.
130. See Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1258, 1265-75. For a more complete description of Intel's
alleged conduct, see infra text accompanying notes 142-165, which describes in detail the FTC's allegations
against Intel regarding the conduct at issue in the Intergraph case, as well as in similar suits against Intel
brought by other Intel customers.
131. Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2dat 1278.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The court entirely discounted Intel's suggestion that it cancelled the licensing agreements simply
because Intergraph had sued it. See id. at 1271 ("Other than Intel's position that it does not wish to do business
with those who sue it ... the court perceives of no rational or legitimate business reason why Intel would
immediately terminate its NDAs with Intergraph.").
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the court determined that Intel's intellectual property rights did not provide the company
with a basis for refusing to supply its technical information to Intergraph. In particular,
the court observed that Intel's patent rights did not "confer upon it a privilege or
immunity" from antitrust claims, and that "Unlawful 'exclusionary conduct can include a
monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a [patent or] copyright or to sell a patented or
copyrighted work."'135
Like the Kodak opinion, the Intergraph decision places no weight on case law and
congressional policy safeguarding intellectual property rights. Rather, the court's
judgment on the issue of Intel's unilateral refusal to deal is a mixture of essential facility
analysis and, evidenced by its consideration of Intel's business justifications, an intent
analysis imported from non-intellectual property cases. There is also a hint of the
Supreme Court's determination in Aspen Skiing that a patent holder's destruction of a
business relationship from which it benefited evidences anticompetitive conduct. 136 The
Intergraph opinion contains no analysis of whether the use of a patent right to coerce the
grant of a reciprocal right constitutes patent misuse, or of under what circumstances such
forced reciprocity might constitute an antitrust violation. 13 7
Finally, another court has opened the door to an intellectual property duty to deal by
qualifying the exclusionary right of copyright holders. 138 In Data General Corp. v.
Grumman Systems Support Corp.,139 the First Circuit announced in dictum that
copyrighted work is vulnerable to antitrust proscriptions on the basis that an "author's
desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work" is merely a "presumptively
valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers." 140 The court observed
that the presumption could be rebutted in those "rare" cases in which "imposing antitrust
135. Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (citing Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125
F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997)).
136. See Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (placing weight on the fact that Intel had licensed to
Intergraph "for the last four years on a mutually beneficial basis").
137. Although the Intergraph court's reasoning, noted above, is open to criticism, the court's decision could
have rested on more justifiable grounds. As the Intergraph court recognized, Intergraph converted its products
from incorporating its own Clipper microprocessor to incorporating Intel microprocessors on reliance upon
Intel's "assurances and representations that Intel's CPUs had the necessary computing power and speed for
Intergraph's high-end workstations and that Intel would supply its CPUs to Intergraph on fair and reasonable
terms." Id. at 1264. By the end of 1993, Intergraph had ceased to develop the Clipper microprocessor, thereby
eliminating a competitor of Intel in microprocessors for the high-end workstation market. See id. Intel's alleged
conduct in convincing Intergraph to cease Clipper technology development in exchange for the dependency on
Intel, joined by Intel's reneging on its promise, raises the question whether any justification exists for any
reduction in competition that resulted when Intergraph apparently ceased development of the Clipper
technology. While the court does not focus on an assessment of competitive impact, and seems largely
concerned with intent and conduct, it at least hints that Intel's role in the demise of Clipper technology
development played some part in its determination of the outcome. See id. at 1276 (noting that Intergraph's
relinquishment of its own microprocessor technology "in reliance on Intel's representations that it would be a
reliable source of technical information and technology to Intergraph ... reinforce[d] and magnifie[d] Intel's
monopoly power"). If in fact competition was reduced by Intel's broken promise and forced reciprocal licensing,
a finding of both patent misuse and antitrust violation would be justified.
138. Copyright law essentially parallels patent law on the issue of antitrust violations. See supra note I
(discussing the overlap of patent and copyright principles).
139. 36 F.3d 1147 (Ist Cir. 1994).
140. Id. at 1187.
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liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act." 14 1 While it is
difficult to imagine what sort of factual situation would fall within this exception, the
First Circuit unfortunately has provided underpinning for further invasion of duty-to-deal
notions into the intellectual property domain.
IV. CURRENT CASES
Both the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Kodak and the Intergraph decision illustrate the
difficulties of extending general duty-to-deal notions into the intellectual property
context. The sole exception should be in connection with the historical doctrines of patent
or copyright misuse, outlined in section III.B. Two current cases-the Intel and Microsoft
antitrust cases-provide further occasion to examine the interrelationship between
antitrust and intellectual property law, including aspects of duty-to-deal principles.
A. Intel
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") instituted an action against the Intel
Corporation, claiming that Intel violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTCA"). 142 The FTC asserted that Intel had "entrenched" its monopoly power in the
microprocessor market1 43 by "denying or threatening to deny technical information about
Intel microprocessor products to Intel customers who have developed and patented
innovations in microprocessor technology, as a means of coercing those customers into
licensing their innovations to Intel."144
The backdrop to the FTC's charges was, as alleged in its complaint, that Intel had
monopoly power in the microprocessor market, evidenced by market studies performed
by Intel. These studies indicated that in each of the previous five years (1993-1998),
"Intel microprocessor products ha[d] accounted for approximately 80 percent of the total
dollar sales of general-purpose microprocessors." 145 Furthermore, Intel had traditionally
promoted its microprocessors by "providing customers with technical information about
new Intel products in advance of their commercial release." 146 Finally, the licensing
arrangements had been very beneficial for both sides: advanced technical information
permitted Intel's customers "to develop and introduce new computer products
incorporating the latest microprocessor technology as early as possible," and the
incorporation of Intel designs into customers' computer systems obviously benefited
Intel. 147
141. Id.at1186n.64.
142. Section 5 of the FTCA empowers the FTC to "prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations... from
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994).
143. See Complaint I 11, In re Intel Corp. (F.T.C. June 8, 1998) (No. 9288), available in WL FATR-FTC.
A microprocessor is the "central processing unit of a computer system." Id. 2. "Intel's microprocessor products
include a family of devices that are marketed and sold under the trade names Pentium, Pentium with MMX,
Pentium Pro, and Pentium II." Id.
144. Id. 11.
145. Id. 6.
146. Complaint 112, Intel (F.T.C. June 8, 1998) (No. 9288).
147. Id.
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The crux of the FTC's complaint was that Intel suspended its established licensing
arrangements with at least three customers 148 in order to "forc[e] those customers to
grant Intel licenses to microprocessor-related technology developed and owned by those
customers." 149 The affected customers were thereafter unable to "remain competitive in
developing and bringing to market in a timely manner computer systems based on Intel
microprocessors."' 150 Such conduct, according to the complaint, was exclusionary
because it "diminish[ed] the incentives of the industry to develop new and improved
microprocessor and related technologies." 151 The result, the FTC alleged, was that Intel
had been able to strengthen its already formidable monopoly position in the "current-
generation" general-purpose microprocessor market, and to reduce competition in the
development of new microprocessor technology.1
52
Discerning the ways in which the Intel case placed antitrust and intellectual property
doctrine into conflict requires some review of the allegations regarding each of the
affected customers. The complaint alleged that Intel ceased to do business with Digital
Equipment Corp. after Digital brought a patent infringement action against Intel.1 53 In
particular, when Intel introduced the Pentium Pro microprocessor in 1995, Digital
concluded that Intel had incorporated Digital microprocessor technology from its Alpha
microprocessors, and that Intel therefore had infringed Digital's patents regarding the
Alpha technology. 154 On the basis of these conclusions, in May of 1997, Digital sued
Intel for the infringement of ten Digital microprocessor patents. 155 Intel's response to
Digital's lawsuit was to deny Digital access to "any of the Intel technical information
needed to continue developing in a timely and efficient manner new computer systems
incorporating new Intel microprocessors." 156
The FTC further alleged that Intel ceased to license to Intergraph "important
information relating to graphics technology" 15 7 after Intergraph refused to accede to
Intel's demand that Intergraph grant Intel a royalty-free license to Intergraph's own
microprocessor technology. 158 In 1997, Intergraph asserted that "certain third parties
using Intel-based computer technology were infringing certain Intergraph patents." 159 In
response, according to the complaint, the third parties sought indemnification from Intel,
which in turn prompted Intel to exert additional pressure on Intergraph to grant to Intel
the royalty-free licenses it desired. 160 Intergraph again refused to comply, and, in
response, "Intel cut off Intergraph's access to any of the Intel technical information
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necessary to continue developing in a timely and efficient manner new computer systems
incorporating new Intel microprocessors."161
Finally, the FTC complaint asserted that Intel ceased to license to Compaq
Computer Corp. after Compaq sued Packard Bell Electronics, also a computer systems
manufacturer, "for using patented Compaq technology in Packard Bell computer
systems." 162 As the supplier of the allegedly infringing Packard Bell technology, Intel
intervened as defendant on the basis that it was obliged to indemnify Packard Bell for any
damages obtained against it. The complaint thus alleged that, as with Digital and
Intergraph, Intel severed the licensing arrangement with Compaq in response to
Compaq's assertion of its patent rights. 1
63
In sum, the complaint alleged monopolizing conduct in Intel's cessation of dealings
with the companies after it had been either directly or indirectly sued by each company.
The complaint asserted that such conduct was not "reasonably necessary to serve any
legitimate, procompetitive purpose"164 and that it has "entrenche[d] [Intel's] monopoly
power in the current generation of general-purpose microprocessor" and "diminishe[d]
the incentives of any firm dependent on Intel to develop microprocessor-related
technologies." 165
The Intel case presents strains of the "intent" line of duty-to-deal cases 166 because
there was an issue as to whether Intel's conduct was predicated on a desire to harm its
competitor/customers, or whether it simply did not wish to conduct business with its
litigation opponents. The case also resonates with the "essential facility" line of cases
167
in that it raised a suggestion that Intel's microprocessors either are an essential facility
generally, or have become an essential facility to these particular competitors because of
the lock-in effect resulting from prior dealing. Lastly, the case contains Aspen-like
notions 16 8 concerning the discontinuation of apparently beneficial business relationships.
The facts in the Intel case present a tempting scenario for "correcting" Intel's alleged
abuse of market power in seemingly purposely crippling customers who dared to assert
intellectual property rights against it. However, the intellectual property considerations
set out in Part III required that the FTC disregard such considerations. What should
matter in such cases is whether a company's attempted or actual acquisition of patent
rights from the alleged victims implicated general Section 2 principles pertinent to patent
acquisition 169 or patent misuse. Under that analysis, the proper outcome is much less
clear.
The following considerations thus should have guided the Intel case: If, in contrast
to the approach of the Intergraph court, 170 the FTC could establish real anticompetitive
161. Complaint 29, Intel (F.T.C. June 8, 1998) (No. 9288).
162. Id. 34.
163. Seeid 35.
164. Id. 20, 30, 36, 40.
165. Id. 39.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 40-52.
169. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey
Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 310-11 (E.D.
Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 125-135.
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effects resulting from Intel's alleged conduct, 171 then such conduct would be
appropriately condemned as a misuse of market power. 172 If, on the other hand, Intel in
fact did not use its patent rights as a leveraging tool to coerce its customers, or otherwise
misuse those rights, then Intel would stand under Section 271's unqualified protection of
intellectual property rights. After all, Congress already decided whether any antitrust
liability should flow from the mere exclusionary impact of Intel's refusal to license, and
its answer was "No."'17
3
Notably, the FTC's complaint did not allege that Intel extended its patent monopoly
through tying arrangements or other leveraging behavior found in past cases to constitute
misuse regardless of competitive effects, or that Intel's patents were invalid or had been
obtained through fraud. It did present issues of attempted or actual coercive reciprocal
dealing regarding Intel's use of market power secured by intellectual property rights to
obtain other rights from possibly unwilling licensors. 174 The somewhat speculative
factual underpinnings of this potentially legitimate theory surfaced in connection with the
consent decree that resolved the dispute.
The consent decree prevents Intel from restricting access to advance technical
information or microprocessors as "leverage" in an intellectual property dispute with a
customer. 175 Under the agreement, Intel is prohibited from withholding or threatening to
withhold advance technical information from a customer for "reasons related to an
Intellectual Property Dispute" if the customer is receiving technical information from
Intel at the time the dispute arises. 176 The company is also prohibited from refusing to
171. The complaint alleged the following anticompetitive effects from Intel's conduct: Intel injured "the
ability of [its] customers to remain competitive in developing and bringing to market... computer systems
based on Intel microprocessors," thereby "reduc[ing] competition to develop new microprocessor technology
and future generations of microprocessor products," Complaint 11 13, 39, Intel (F.T.C. June 8, 1998) (No.
9288); reduced the incentives of its customers "to develop new innovations relating to microprocessor
technology," id. 1 14; and entrenched its monopoly power in microprocessors, see id. 39.
172. There are almost no reported misuse decisions involving reciprocal dealing. There are, however,
"leverage" precedents amply supporting misuse through reciprocal dealing that produces anticompetitive effect.
See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1169-70 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that there
can be no "copyright misuse" unless elements of an antitrust violation are shown); Windsurfing Int'l v. AMF,
782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("To sustain a misuse defense involving a licensing arrangement
not held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a factual determination must reveal that the
overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant
market.").
173. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88. A further complication in the Intel case flows from the
variety of goods and services that Intel allegedly withheld. Some appear to be subject to patent and some to
copyright protection, but much of the Intel information at issue may be subject only to trade secret protection.
As noted earlier, the appropriate balancing of trade secret principles against antitrust goals is much less clear
than that regarding patents or copyrights. See supra note I. This raises the question of Intel's duty to deal
regarding trade secret information. It is at least logically possible that a court could reach different conclusions
regarding the duty to deal with respect to trade secrets, requiring Intel to make available only products or
information not covered by patent or copyright. It is just this intermixture of patented or copyrighted material
with other material not covered by patent or copyright law that appears to have caused the Ninth Circuit so
much difficulty in Kodak. See supra text accompanying notes 114-123.
174. See Complaint 13, 18, 19, 26-29, 34, 35, 39, Intel (F.T.C. June 8, 1998) (No. 9288).
175. Analysis of Proposed Consent Order at 20-21, In re Intel Corp. (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (No. 9288),
available in WL-FATR-FTC.
176. Decision and Order ILA, In re Intel Corp. (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (No. 9288), available in WL-FATR-
FTC.
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sell or threatening to refuse to sell microprocessors to a customer for reasons related to an
intellectual property dispute with that customer. 17
7
The FTC's Analysis of the Proposed Consent Order contains a more complete
account than did the complaint of the FTC's rationale for pursuing this action against
Intel. While the FTC in this Analysis notes that its concern was that advance technical
information about new microprocessor products is "essential" to Intel's OEM
customers, 178 it primarily relies on coerced reciprocal dealing and the resulting
anticompetitive effects. Noting that Intel refused to deal "as a means of coercing those
customers into licensing their patented innovations to Intel," 179 the FTC strains to
articulate effects in the market for microprocessors that allegedly would continue Intel's
dominance in that market. First, firms that might otherwise challenge Intel's dominance
in the microprocessor market are disadvantaged because they are unable to obtain access
to the wide range of developing technology to which Intel has preferential access as a
result of its conduct. 180 Second, customers' incentives to develop microprocessor-related
technologies, and thus innovation in such technologies, is diminished as a result of Intel's
coercing its customers to license away their intellectual property rights. 18 1 And third, it is
more difficult for OEMs to serve as platforms for competing microprocessors and to
"differentiate their computer systems from their competitors['] through patented
technology" because an OEM seeking to enforce its intellectual property rights against
other Intel customers is subject to retaliation from Intel. 18 2
Whatever one thinks of the FTC's effort to articulate anticompetitive effects in the
peculiar factual circumstances of Intel, it is encouraging that the Commission appeared to
recognize that antitrust liability flowed only from the existence (even if only presumed)
of such harm to competition. 183 Of equal importance, it seemed to acknowledge the
congressional balancing already in place by pointing out that the settlement "does not
impose any kind of broad 'compulsory licensing' regime upon Intel." 184 Intel retains the
discretion "to decide in the first instance" whether to provide information to customers
and whether to supply additional or earlier information to particular customers as part of
a joint venture, for example. 185 Had the FTC glossed over these key issues, its Intel case
177. See id. These provisions hold even when a customer has asserted patent infringement against Intel and
is seeking legal or equitable remedies, including damages, reasonable royalties, and attorneys fees and costs.
See id. The sole exception arises when a customer is seeking an injunction against Intel's manufacture, sale, use,
offer to sell, or importation of its microprocessors. See id. In such a situation, Intel "may request a customer to
waive that remedy and give the customer a reasonable opportunity to make a simple written statement to that
effect." Analysis of Proposed Consent Order at 21, Intel (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (No. 9288). Only if the customer
refuses will Intel be allowed to refuse to provide technical information or products with regard to the
microprocessors that the customer is seeking to enjoin. Decision and Order ILA, Intel (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (No.
9288).
178. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order at 14, Intel (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (No. 9288).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 17.
181. See id. The Commission never quite explains the relationship between "microprocessor-related"
technologies and microprocessors themselves, or how diminished innovation in the former impacts the latter.
See id.
182. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order at 17, Intel (F.T.C. Mar. 1999) (No. 9288).
183. See id. at 18-19.
184. Id. at 20 (emphasis provided).
185. Id.
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held the potential further to confuse duty-to-deal law and continue the unwarranted
extension of general duty-to-deal precedent into the intellectual property realm.
B. Microsoft
The Microsoft case presents other challenges to antitrust law in the intellectual
property context. Although the litigation involves a wide range of alleged antitrust
violations, the following discussion highlights only those aspects in the case of relevance
to duty-to-deal issues and intellectual property rights.
The U.S. Department of Justice and twenty states have filed complaints alleging
antitrust violations stemming from Microsoft's marketing of its Internet browser. Each
complaint alleges that Microsoft has attempted "to maintain its monopoly in operating
systems and to achieve dominance in other markets" through the use of tying
arrangements, exclusive dealing contracts, and other exclusionary agreements that "deter
innovation, exclude competition, and rob customers of their right to choose among
competing alternatives."' 186 The heart of the complaints is that Microsoft effectively
destroyed the ability of Netscape Corporation and other competitors to market their
Internet browsing software by tying its browser, Internet Explorer, to its operating
systems, Windows 95 and Windows 98.187 The plaintiffs further argue that Microsoft has
used its dominant position in the operating systems market to restrict the use of
competing browsers by original equipment manufacturers, Internet access providers, and
Internet content providers.188
Microsoft has defended itself by arguing, inter alia,189 that Internet Explorer is an
integral element of Windows and has always been incorporated into the Windows design,
and is therefore not a separate product under any kind of tying analysis. 190 Microsoft's
186. Complaint 36, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Microsoft Complaint]. Specifically, the complaints allege that Microsoft:
(I) unreasonably restrained competition by "tying" its Internet browser to Windows 98; (2)
unreasonably restrained competition by entering into "exclusive dealing" arrangements with
various Internet providers; (3) unreasonably restrained competition by imposing "boot and start-
up screen" restrictions on original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"); (4) illegally maintained a
monopoly in its operating system software through various exclusionary and predatory practices,
including, but not limited to, the tying and exclusive dealing arrangements; and (5) attempted to
monopolize the market for Internet browsers.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998). The
states also brought a claim of monopoly leveraging, contending that "Microsoft has unlawfully used its
operating system monopoly to obtain a competitive advantage in the browser market." Id. The district court
denied Microsoft's summary judgment motion on all claims except for the states' monopoly leveraging claim.
See id.
187. See Microsoft Complaint, supra note 186,1 I 111, 117.
188. See id. 75-102.
189. Microsoft has also contended that a company with a large market share should not be "precluded from
competing vigorously with its rivals by engaging in ordinary business practices such as developing improved
products, exercising its rights under the federal copyright laws and entering into routine cross-marketing
arrangements." Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support .of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 31, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14,
1998).
190. See id. at 21 ("[T]here is no distinct product called Internet Explorer that can be separated from
Windows 98 without doing serious violence to the operating system."). In addition, Microsoft asserts that
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position, then, is that because the joining of Internet Explorer with its operating system
constitutes an integrated product, it cannot be the case that the company extended its
power from one market into the other. The fact that the two products have been
"integrated" means that there is only one product, and hence only one market, at issue.
The Microsoft case may be viewed as a duty-to-deal case because one government
objective is to force Microsoft to make Windows available to customers without an
embedded Internet browser. In this regard, the primary legal issue is whether Microsoft's
Internet Explorer should be considered "inside" or "outside" the market where Microsoft's
power is protected by its intellectual property rights in Windows. If the market-the
Windows monopoly-is defined to include the browser, then no antitrust issues arise
under intellectual property principles or other rules. If it excludes the browser, then both
antitrust and misuse law come into play.
The Microsoft case raises the concern that courts, in their efforts to curb monopoly
power (legitimately) obtained or protected through intellectual property rights, will be
tempted to define the relevant market "around" the intellectual property right. This was
the mistake of the Ninth Circuit in holding that the power created by Kodak's intellectual
property right was conceptually restricted to only a single, narrowly-defined parts market.
It was also the approach underlying past conceptual mistakes in the intersection between
intellectual property and antitrust law, such as the equation of a patent right with a
market1 91 and the presumption that an intellectual property right creates monopoly
power. 19 2 An overly narrow definition of the relevant market not only will overstate the
market power created by intellectual property rights, but also will subject the intellectual
property holder to claims of illicit extension if the intellectual property becomes part, but
not all, of a broader "product."
In seeming recognition of this issue, the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft has set a fairly
minimal standard for determining whether Windows and Internet Explorer constitute one
or two products (and thus, whether they compete in one or two markets). 193 As
interpreted by the D.C. Circuit, the concept of integration "is most reasonably understood
as a product that combines functionalities (which may also be marketed separately and
operated together) in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are
bought separately and combined by the purchaser." 194 The integrated product "must also
Windows passes the relevant test of whether the bundling of Internet Explorer with the operating system
achieves technologically beneficial results vis-a-vis a purchaser's merging of related individual functionalities.
See id.
191. Congress has remedied the doctrine by amending the section of the Patent Act pertaining to misuse.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
192. This presumption arguably still exists as a matter of Supreme Court law, see Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984), but it has few adherents, see 10 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 1737b, at 92 (1996) ("[A]nalysis and most current lower courts decline to infer power from
the limited legal monopolies conferred by patents, copyrights, or trademarks.").
193. An unlawful tying arrangement may be found only when there are two separate products at issue. See
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969). Whether the two products are
indeed separate is determined according to the "character of the demand" for them. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
19. Generally, two products exist if there is "sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to
provide" each separately. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
194. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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be better in some respect," in the sense that it exhibits some "technological value."'
195
Thus, the test for the integration of two products is whether the combination of the two
products provides technological benefits beyond those that could be achieved by a
purchaser who bought the products separately and performed the integration himself.
196
Because the institutional competence of courts for assessing product design is extremely
circumscribed, "technically interconnected products are immune from tying claims as
long as the physical interconnection of the two products achieves some technologically
beneficial result." 19 7 To prevail on a technological tying claim, then, a plaintiff must
show that the integration of one product with another was done only "for the purpose of
tying the products." 1
98
This antitrust analysis squares appropriately with patent principles where misuse
arises from conduct that "extend[s] the economic impact of the patent beyond the area
actually claimed and the statutory period of monopoly."1 99 Misuse does not arise where
"packaging" the product results in a technological improvement. At that point, there
should be no more query as to whether two separate products are tied to one another
because the unit of analysis has become a single product.
That said, a recent Federal Circuit case, C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc.,20 0 hints
that the seemingly settled misuse doctrine may not be all that secure. In that case,
plaintiff Bard alleged that M3 had infringed its patents on a biopsy gun and on needles
designed to fit the gun. In defense, M3 alleged that Bard had "unlawfully leveraged its
monopoly power in the guns to obtain a competitive advantage in replacement needles by
modifying its gun to accept only Bard needles." 20 1 Although the jury had not considered
whether Bard's modification of its gun and needles constituted patent misuse,202 the court
nonetheless affirmed the jury's verdict that the purpose of the technological advancement
was to thwart competition, and that Bard had therefore violated Section 2.203
Yet it is unclear how Bard's conduct of creating a technologically advanced biopsy
gun violated antitrust strictures. It appears that the court ignored the presumption that
technological innovation is an advancement rather than a monopolistic restraint on
competition 2° 4 and thus allowed the jury to overrule the Patent Office's determination
195. Id. at 949.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 950.
198. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 (quoting Response of Carolina, Inc., v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d
1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976)). A court need not determine that the integrated product "is superior to its stand-
alone rivals." Id. (citing ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,
439 (N.D. Cal. 1978)). Rather, the key question is whether the integration "brings some advantage." Id.
199. 6 CHISUM, supra note 90, § 19.04[2] at 19-299.
200. 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
201. Id. at 1367.
202. The jury did find that Bard had misused its patents, but only on the basis that Bard had attempted to
enforce its patents against goods that it knew were not infringing. See id. at 1372. Thus, the only misuse defense
the jury considered was unrelated to the subject of the antitrust charge. In any event, the appeals court reversed
on this issue and concluded that Bard had not misused any of its patents. See id. at 1373.
203. See id. at 1382-83.
204. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
development and introduction of a system of technologically interrelated products is not sufficient alone to
establish a per se unlawful tying arrangement even if the new products are incompatible with the products then
1999]
The Journal of Corporation Law
that the integration of the two products provided a sufficient technological advancement
to warrant a patent. Some reassurances may be found in Judge Gajarsa's concurrence in
the court's order declining Bard's suggestion for rehearing en banc. Noting that "the
majority opinion turns solely on Bard's argument regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence and its failure to challenge the propriety of the jury instructions," he concluded
that the case cannot be read to address "The question of whether or not a cause of action
premised upon the antitrust laws exists when a patentee redesigns a patented product
within the scope of the patent claims."
205
V. CONCLUSIONS
As intellectual property becomes a more frequent subject of antitrust actions, courts
need clear guiding principles to follow in determining the circumstances in which
antitrust defendants should be obligated to deal with other parties. Establishing such
principles is even more important where courts deciding non-intellectual property duty-
to-deal cases have failed to develop consistent and coherent rationales. In the process,
however, the special problems presented by the intellectual property context must be
heeded. Addressing unilateral refusals to deal involving patent rights or copyrights
requires insight both into the purposes animating the intellectual property and antitrust
laws, and into the types of intellectual property concerns that are likely to arise in a
rapidly advancing technological society. Such considerations lead, at least at the outset,
to the conclusion that courts should impose a duty to deal on intellectual property
antitrust defendants only where the intellectual property holder has misused its rights in
some way. However, as the above discussions pertaining to the Intel and Microsoft cases
suggest, there remain many questions to be resolved.
offered by the competition and effective use of any one of the new products necessitates purchase of some or all
of the others.").
205. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 161 F.3d 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
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